Offense at your door : Roman Catholics, Jehovah's Witnesses, judicial review, and Cantwell v. Connecticut, 1938-1940 by Batlan, Katharine M.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright 
by 
Katharine M. Batlan 
2014 
 
 
The Report Committee for Katharine M. Batlan 
Certifies that this is the approved version of the following report: 
 
 
Offense at Your Door:  
Roman Catholics, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Judicial Review,  
and Cantwell v. Connecticut, 1938-1940 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPROVED BY 
SUPERVISING COMMITTEE: 
 
 
 
Jennifer Graber 
Thomas A. Tweed 
 
Supervisor: 
 
Offense at Your Door: 
Roman Catholics, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Judicial Review,  
and Cantwell v. Connecticut, 1938-1940 
 
by 
Katharine M. Batlan, B.A., M.T.S 
 
 
Report 
Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of  
The University of Texas at Austin 
in Partial Fulfillment  
of the Requirements 
for the Degree of  
 
Master of Arts  
 
 
The University of Texas at Austin 
May 2014 
 
 iv 
Acknowledgements 
 
The author wishes to thank her two readers, Jennifer Graber and Thomas A. 
Tweed, for their patience and diligent reading of drafts of this material. They helped 
shape the paper into a strong argument with clear writing. This paper also benefitted from 
a research travel grant from the Department of Religious Studies at the University of 
Texas at Austin. Archivists at the Knights of Columbus, Susan Bronson, and Archdiocese 
of Hartford, Maria Paxi, provided access to important printed materials to help develop 
the Catholic perspective in this research. Finally, the author wishes to thank her family 
for their support. Their countless hours of listening to her talk about religion and law 
helped in the development of thoughts for this work. 
 
 v 
Abstract 
 
Offense at Your Door:  
Roman Catholics, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Judicial Review,  
and Cantwell v. Connecticut, 1938-1940 
 
Katharine M. Batlan, M.A. 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2014 
 
Supervisor:  Jennifer Graber 
 
Cantwell v. Connecticut (1940) marked a new moment in religious liberties in the 
United States. In this case the Supreme Court nationalized free exercise of religion. 
While many legal scholars point to this case as important for precedents used in the 
arguments of subsequent cases, the context from which this case emerged was also 
important. I argue that Cantwell should also be studied for what it can tell us about 
religious conflict at the time. In Cantwell the Supreme Court of the United States 
incorporated the free exercise of religion to states, but in doing so it obscured the real 
religious tensions between Roman Catholics and Jehovah’s Witnesses and local efforts to 
adjudicate those conflicts. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On April 26, 1938, four Jehovah’s Witnesses traveled to a Connecticut street 
populated by Catholics to proselytize.  They sought out those Catholics, promoted 
Jehovah’s Witnesses views, and questioned Catholicism’s value. After a conflict arose, 
the Witnesses encountered Catholic police officers who arrested them.  The Jehovah’s 
Witnesses were found guilty of some offences at the local level, but they appealed the 
ruling.  By 1940, this case, Cantwell v. Connecticut, reached the Supreme Court of the 
United States. It is noteworthy because Justice Owen J. Roberts’s opinion in the case 
significantly changed the way free exercise of religion has later been interpreted by 
courts, legislatures, town councils, and other civic institutions. Religion scholars have 
mostly overlooked the significance of this case, and, more generally, underemphasized 
the ways that the law has mediated religious practice in the United States, even though 
some have been very concerned about religion in the public arena.1 Legal scholars who 
are concerned with civil liberties in the United States have given Cantwell more attention. 
                                                
1 On religion and law see Edwin Gaustad, Faith of the Founders: Religion and the New Nation, 1776-1826 
(Waco, Tex.: Baylor University Press, 2004), Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, Paying the Words Extra: 
Religious Discourse in the Supreme Court of the United States (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 1994), Tisa Wenger, We have a Religion: the 1920s Pueblo Indian Dance Controversy and 
American Religious Freedom (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009), Amanda Porterfield, 
Conceived in Doubt: Religion and Politics in the New American Nation (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2012), Isaac Weiner, Religion Out Loud: Religious Sound, Public Space, and American Pluralism 
(New York; New York University Press, 2013). On religion in the public arena see, for example, Sally M. 
Promey “The Public Display of Religion,” in The Visual Culture of American Religions, eds. David 
Morgan and Sally M. Promey, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001). Leila Ahmed A Quiet 
Revolution: The Veil’s Resurgence from the Middle East to America (New Haven, Conn.; Yale University 
Press, 2011), Diana Eck, A New Religious America: How a “Christian Country” Has Become the World’s 
Most Religiously Diverse Nation, (New York: Harper San Francisco, 2001). 
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They have scoured the case to draw out principles to be used in subsequent cases.2 This 
focus is appropriate and understandable, given their role-specific concern.  But, I suggest 
in this M.A. Report that legal scholars’ approach has obscured a good deal that might be 
relevant for understanding the religious history of minority faiths and for considering 
varying scales of analysis in legal practice. I suggest that a detailed analysis of this case 
has implications for thinking about how both religious historians and legal scholars do 
their work. As a historian of religion in the United States, I focus initially on historical 
events at the local level, presenting some local details and constitutional factors to 
establish the context, and then move on to the national case. In the conclusion, I analyze 
the implications of this case which shows what happens when U.S. two religious 
minorities, Jehovah’s Witnesses and Roman Catholics, contest for believers in public 
space.  
The Connecticut legal dispute, which is the focus of this project, was the first case 
dealing explicitly with inter-religious competition to make it to the Supreme Court. But 
the New Haven skirmish was one of many around the country in which Jehovah’s 
Witnesses and Roman Catholics disputed where and how religious messages could be 
spread in public spaces. By taking this multi-scalar and multi-disciplinary approach, 
some discontinuities between the local and the national appear.  
                                                
2 Vincent Martin Bonventre, “Symposium: A Second-Class Constitutional Right? Free Exercise and the 
Current State of Religious Freedom in the United States,” Albany Law Review 70 (2006): 1399-1415. 
Walter G. DoSocio, “Protecting the Rights of Religious Cults,” Human Rights Law Journal 38 (1979): 38-
52. Eugene Volokh, “Freedom of Speech, Religious Harassment Law, and Religious Accommodation 
Law,” Loyola University Chicago Law Journal 33 (2001): 57-69. Mary Barbara McCarthy, “The 
Application of the First Amendment to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution,” Notre 
Dame Law Review 22 (1946): 400-411. “Religious Immunity from Police Power,” Marshall Law Quarterly 
8 (1942): 25-37. 
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I argue that in Cantwell v. Connecticut, the Supreme Court of the United States 
nationalized free exercise claims, but in doing so it obscured the very real religious 
tensions between Roman Catholics and Jehovah’s Witnesses and local efforts to 
adjudicate those conflicts. In Connecticut, local officials enforced laws designed to allow 
residents to live their lives free of disturbances. The Cantwells’ evangelizing foray into a 
largely Catholic neighborhood created a disturbance. The Supreme Court ruled not only 
that free exercise of religion was more important than keeping the peace, but also that 
even irritating proselytization is protected as free exercise.  The Court’s resolution of the 
dispute forever changed how religious liberties were dealt with in the United States. 
While a disjuncture between key concerns at the federal and local levels is 
understandable, the differences are striking.  
I hope to advance the discussion by building on the scholarly conversation about 
this important case. Books and articles about the Cantwell case usually focus on its 
impact as a precedent for future state cases on the broad principle of religious freedom.3 
If religion is evaluated as a factor at all, the proselytizing Jehovah’s Witnesses are 
examined, not their Catholic targets.4 An encyclopedia article on this case, for example, 
neglects to mention the Catholics with whom the Jehovah’s Witnesses jostled.5 Jehovah’s 
Witnesses in the 1940s and 50s actively brought numerous cases to the Supreme Court, 
                                                
3 Walter G. DoSocio, “Protecting the Rights of Religious Cults,” 38-52. Eugene Volokh, “Freedom of 
Speech,” 57-69. Mary Barbara McCarthy, “The Application of the First Amendment to the States by the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution,” Notre Dame Law Review 22 (1946): 400-411. “Religious 
Immunity from Police Power,” Marshall Law Quarterly 8 (1942): 25-37. 
4 Shawn Francis Peters, Judging Jehovah’s Witnesses: Religious Persecution and the Dawn of the Rights 
Revolution (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2000): 178-202. 
5 Scott A. Merriman. Religion and the Law in America: An Encyclopedia of Personal Belief and Public 
Policy, (Santa Barbara, Cal: A.B.C. C.L.I.O., Inc., 2007): 167-168. 
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and some studies lump these cases together in larger discussions about religious liberty 
for minority religious communities.6 In a significant project on civil liberties in American 
history, Anthony Lewis devotes one line to the particulars of the conflict, noting that the 
case takes place in a “largely Catholic neighborhood.”  He does not spend more than a 
paragraph on the case as a whole and gets a fact wrong in the process.7 It makes sense 
that scholars and citizens are preoccupied with how these decisions will impact lives 
rather than the mundane facts that precipitated the dispute or its adjudication. Legal 
professionals extract the general principles the Supreme Court articulated in its opinion 
and use them to argue for their clients’ religious liberty in other, often dramatically 
different cases. That expansive use makes Supreme Court cases attractive to legal and 
religion scholars because they have broad impact and because their principles often apply 
to lower courts around the country.  Cantwell, in particular, made a major impact. But, an 
illuminating angle of vision would come into focus if, as I have tried to do in this M.A. 
report, scholars also directed attention toward what was evaluated at the local trial and 
how the Court obscured or minimized local facts.  
As we consider Cantwell, a new narrative emerges when the analytical focus 
shifts back to the criminal court of common pleas in New Haven. Instead of an account of 
how the Supreme Court’s understanding of religious free exercise applies to states 
through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (a complicated concept I 
                                                
6 Ken I. Kersch, Constructing Civil Liberties; Discontinuities in the Development of American 
Constitutional Law, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004): 283-324. 
7 Anthony Lewis, Freedom for the Thought that We Hate: A Biography of the First Amendment, (New 
York: Basic Books, 2007): 111-112. He takes the assumptions of the Supreme Court that the male lay 
Jehovah’s Witnesses can be viewed as ministers, and runs with it slightly further than the Supreme Court 
decision articulates. 
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will discuss later), Cantwell becomes a story of two religious minorities fighting it out in 
a local context for territory and souls.  
This M.A. Report tells the overlooked story of that local conflict. It is organized 
to mirror the case’s movement through the legal system. The first section deals with 
contextual details of Cassius Street in New Haven, Connecticut, and the incident on April 
26, 1938, that prompted the case. In section two, I explicate and analyze the conflicted 
legal proceedings between the two religious communities at the local and state levels. 
This includes the Cantwell case’s trial and first appeal, as well as some analysis of other 
conflicts between Jehovah’s Witnesses and Catholics across the United States. These two 
religious minorities negotiated their place within American society through these 
interactions. I try to show that the Jehovah’s Witness agenda in challenging previously 
held understandings of civil liberties is key to better understanding the conflict. In section 
three, I focus on the case at the national level. This naturally revolves around the 
Supreme Court case. I argue that the then recent history of the Court prompted Justices to 
extend the reach of civil liberties farther than ever before. As the case appeared only three 
years after President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s court packing plan failed, the Supreme 
Court asserting itself is noteworthy. I will also lay out the implications of the decision, 
pointing to some of the ways it impacted Connecticut and discussions of legal arguments 
related to the Bill of Rights. In the final section, I discuss some of the issues that result 
from the overemphasis on Supreme Court results in the U.S. court system and among 
legal scholars of the U.S. I end by proposing some ways for both legal scholars and 
religious studies scholars and to consider multiple levels of analysis in their work in order 
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to preserve the contextual particulars for purposes beyond asserting generalized 
principles. Details matter. They made a difference in the lives of the people who brought 
the case forward and I will show they should affect the way scholars read and analyze the 
case. 
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Chapter 1: Cassius Street, 1938: The Context of the Case 
According to religion scholar Robert Orsi, “the spaces of the cities, their different 
topographies and demographics, are fundamental to the kinds of religious phenomena 
that emerge in them.”8 Local, state, and national events shape religious practice, or in this 
instance, religious conflict. So before analyzing the incident that began the legal process 
that reimagined the free exercise clause of the federal Constitution, I describe the context 
by considering cultural and political patterns and offering a historical reconstruction of 
the urban landscape and the local residents.   
DEMOGRAPHICS 
New Haven’s Cassius Street, where the disputed events took place, was one block 
long. The federal census records for 1930 counted 136 residents.9 Over half of the 
population had at least one parent born in Ireland (see Table 1).  
                                                
8 Robert Orsi, Gods of the City: Religion and the American Urban Landscape (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1999), 44. 
9 Statistics drawn from 1930 U. S. Census, New Haven County, Connecticut, population schedule, 3rd 
Representative District, New Haven, enumeration district (ED) 5-28; digital images, Ancestry.com 
 www.ancestry.com. 
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Parental Nativity Population Percentage 
United States 38 28% 
Foreign 98 72% 
(Ireland) (70) (51%) 
Table 1: Cassius Street Parent’s Birthplace, U.S. or Foreign, 1930 
 
In addition, 21 percent were foreign-born themselves, with 16 percent of the street’s 
residents born in Ireland (see Table 2). 
Resident Nativity Population Percentage 
United States 108 79% 
Foreign 28 21% 
(Ireland) 22 16% 
Table 2: Cassius Street Residents Birthplace U.S. or Foreign, 1930 
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Residents’ national origin in 1930 also included Italy, Russia, England, Sweden, 
Germany and Scotland.10 The percentage of Cassius Street residents with Irish nativity 
exceeded the Connecticut averages for the total state population—8 percent in 1930 and 7 
percent in 1940.11  
By 1940, when we can notice the full effects of the exclusionary immigration act 
of 1924, 89 percent of the 157 Cassius Street residents were born in the United States, 
with only 11 percent from another country (see Table 3).12  
Resident Nativity Population Percentage 
United States 139 89% 
Foreign 18 11% 
Table 3: Cassius Street Residents Birthplace U.S. or Foreign, 1940 
 
These statistics for percentages of native vs. foreign-born residents reflected patterns for 
New Haven County as a whole. In 1930, 23 percent of white people in New Haven 
                                                
10 Ibid. 
11 Population: Sixteenth Census of the United States, Volume II: Characteristics of the Population, 
(Washington, D.C: United States Government Printing Office, 1943), 820. 
12 1940 U. S. Census, New Haven County, Connecticut, population schedule, 3rd Representative District, 
New Haven, enumeration district (ED) 11-48; digital images, Ancestry.com www.ancestry.com. The 1940 
census did not record the parents’ place of birth.  
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County were born outside the United States, but by 1940, only 19 percent were foreign-
born.13 This case takes place in the midst of these shifting demographics.  
Cassius Street’s location within its New Haven neighborhood helps explain the 
environment. A police station sat on the west end of the street, at the corner of Cassius 
Street and Howard Avenue. Four blocks South was St. Peter’s, the parish for local 
Catholics.14 And four blocks northwest of Cassius Street was the New Haven train 
station. The streets neighboring Cassius, including Howard Avenue on the west and 
Cedar Street on the east, included a majority of residents whose parents came from 
Ireland. On the longer Howard Avenue, there were a few households from Russia, whose 
members probably were Jewish since the census records report they spoke Yiddish.  One 
boarder was from China. Neighbors of Jewish and Chinese backgrounds certainly were a 
minority in that part of New Haven.  
RELIGIOUS GROUPS 
Although it was a minority religious community in the U.S. as a whole, Roman 
Catholics dominated the population in this area of New Haven. Court records from this 
case indicated that ninety percent of the residents on Cassius Street were Catholic.15 
These Catholics from Cassius Street tended to have medium paying, working-class jobs. 
According to Census statistics from 1940, the median income for men was $956 for the 
                                                
13 Population: Sixteenth Census of the United States, Volume II: Characteristics of the Population, 
(Washington, D.C: United States Government Printing Office, 1943), 828. 
14 St. Peter’s used to be located at 164 Kimberly Avenue, New Haven, but was closed in 1991 when the 
parish merged with St. John the Evangelist and is now part of the Sacred Heart Church, which is ten blocks 
away from Cassius Street. http://www.archdioceseofhartford.org/archives_closedparishes.htm 
15 Cantwell v. State of Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). Transcript Of Record. 5-95. 
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nation as a whole.16 The employed adult males on Cassius Street on average made 
slightly higher than $1000. Many worked in jobs affiliated with the train station four 
blocks away.17 This profile was slightly better than the status of Catholics in the United 
States as a whole in the 1920s through the 1940s. According to historian Philip Jenkins, 
“well into the twentieth century, Catholics themselves could scarcely deny that the very 
poor were overrepresented in the American Church.”18 It follows that Catholics tended to 
compete for working-class jobs.19 
The Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society, whose practitioners are known as 
Jehovah’s Witnesses, was the other major religious community who impacted this case. 
Charles Taze Russell founded the group as a Bible study in 1872 by Charles Taze 
Russell.20 The Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society used the Bible as a foundational 
text, with an emphasis on eschatology or end times. Russell’s reading of the Bible 
required Jehovah’s Witnesses to attempt to convert as many people as possible before the 
end, at which time Jesus would return to save the good and condemn the wicked. During 
World War I, the U.S. government imprisoned Russell with other Jehovah’s Witness 
leaders under the Sedition Act for advocating that members refuse to participate in 
                                                
16  “1940 2010 How Has America Changed?” The U.S. Census, 
https://www.census.gov/1940census/pdf/infographic1_text_version.pdf, Accessed March 31, 2014. 
17 1940; Census Place: New Haven, New Haven, Connecticut; Roll: T627_540; Page: 12A; Enumeration 
District: 11-48 from Ancestry.com. 1940 United States Federal Census [database on-line], Provo, UT, 
USA: Ancestry.com Operations Inc, 2002. 
18 Philip Jenkins, The New Anti-Catholicism: The Last Acceptable Prejudice (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2003), 28. 
19 Ibid., 29. 
20 David L. Weddle, “Jehovah’s Witnesses,” in Encyclopedia of Religion, Vol. 7, 2nd ed. ed. Lindsey 
Jones. (Detroit: Macmillan Reference USA, 2005), 4820. 
 12 
military service.21 After Russell’s death in 1916, Joseph Franklin Rutherford took the 
helm. Rutherford (1869-1942) previously had been the chief legal counsel for the 
community, and followers called him “Judge Rutherford.”22 Rutherford also began a 
stronger campaign for door-to-door proselytizing, so Jehovah’s Witnesses became much 
more visible in communities than it had been before.23  
THE INCIDENT AND THE LEGAL ISSUES 
On April 26, 1938, a family of Jehovah’s Witnesses set out to proselytize. Newton 
Cantwell drove with his wife, Esther, and their two teenage sons, Jesse (16) and Russell 
(18), from their home in Woodbridge, Connecticut, to New Haven.24 The Cantwells 
parked their car on the corner of Cassius and Cedar Streets. The men got out of the car, 
taking with them portable phonographs, records, books, and pamphlets produced by the 
Watchtower Bible and Tract Society.25 They then went door-to-door.  
                                                
21 Ibid., 4821. 
22 Herbert Hewitt Stroup, The Jehovah’s Witnesses (New York: Columbia University Press, 1945),13. 
23 Jennifer Jacobs Henderson, “The Jehovah’s Witnesses and Their Plan to Expand First Amendment 
Freedoms,” Journal of Church and State 46, no.4 (2004): 811-832. 
24 This retelling is my own reconstruction drawn from testimony found in Cantwell v. State of Connecticut, 
310 U.S. 296 (1940). Transcript Of Record. 5-95. While more information on the Cantwell family could 
not be found at this time to figure out what the family did in Woodbridge when not proselytizing, some 
other data was found. Newton was born in Tennessee to Tennessee-born parents, while Esther was born in 
Missouri to a father from Virginia and a mother from Kentucky. Russell was at least their sixth child, and 
was born when they lived in Barter County, Arkansas. Jesse, likely their seventh child, was born when they 
lived in Morgan County, Tennessee. The family was involved in farming in those locations. Since I could 
not find a record of the family in the 1940 Federal Census, it is unclear in which industry the family was 
involved after 1930 or whether they remained in Connecticut or moved again. 1930 U. S. Census, New 
population schedule, 3rd Representative District enumeration district (ED) 5, Page: 5B; at Ancestry.com. 
 1930 United States Federal Census [database on-line]. Provo, UT, USA: Ancestry.com Operations Inc, 
2002. 
25 Esther waited in the car for at least two reasons. Jehovah’s Witnesses had strict gender roles for 
members, and safety was generally a concern for women going alone door-to-door in strange 
neighborhoods. 
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The Cantwells chose New Haven’s Cassius Street, this street with ninety percent 
Catholic residents, to proselytize.26 According to media scholar Jennifer Jacobs 
Henderson, Jehovah’s Witnesses at the time attempted to challenge local laws by 
choosing places where their message would likely cause trouble.27 The choice of Cassius 
Street was consistent with what Jacobs alleged as a Jehovah’s Witness practice.  It is 
clear from the transcript of the original trial that Catholicism mattered a great deal to 
most residents and they found the Jehovah’s Witness materials incendiary. While 
Catholics formed a majority on Cassius Street, they were minorities around the state and 
the country. The Cantwells, as Jehovah’s Witnesses, were members of an even smaller 
religious minority.28  
Jehovah’s Witnesses went door-to-door with materials explaining that 
Catholicism was theologically incorrect, even pernicious. Many passages in a Jehovah’s 
Witness book, Riches, highlighted what they considered the problematic nature of the 
Catholic hierarchy. For example, Riches stated that, “The Hierarchy [of the Catholic 
Church] is the masterpiece of the Devil’s organization schemes to defame the name of 
Jehovah God and Christ Jesus and to turn men away from Jehovah.”29 A tract entitled, 
“The Cure,” goes on to assert, “it [the Roman Catholic Church] has ever been known as 
                                                
26 Cantwell v. State of Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). Transcript Of Record. 5-95. 
27 Jennifer Jacobs Henderson, “The Jehovah’s Witnesses,” 811-832. 
28 A small note on the Cantwell Family: According to the 1930 federal census, they lived in Morgan 
County, Tennessee. Newton and Esther lived with six of their children – three girls and three boys. All 
children were under the age of 20. Russell and Jesse were the youngest. The 1920 census mentions one 
more daughter. As the eldest child, and 18 by the 1930 census, she likely married, but could have also died. 
1920 U. S. Census, Wilmot, Ashley, Arkansas, population schedule, enumeration district (ED) 17, page 2A, 
Ancestry.com. 1920 United States Federal Census [database on-line]. Provo, UT, USA: Ancestry.com 
Operations Inc, 2010. 
29 J.F. Rutherford, Riches, (Brooklyn, N.Y.: Watchtower Bible and Tract Society, 1937), 232. 
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an unclean thing, for the reason that many of its leaders and priests have been and are 
morally putrid.”30 One pamphlet focused on the then common question of Catholics’ 
allegiance to the U.S. The pamphlet stated, “Fascism and Nazi-ism [sic] and Roman 
Catholicism, meaning one and the same thing under three names, operate constantly to 
persecute the witnesses of Jehovah, the true followers of Jesus Christ.” Another passage 
that would only prove more sensitive after December 7, 1941, but still provoked listeners 
in 1938 stated, “The Roman Catholic Hierarchy has made an alliance with Japan, which 
people practice another religion.”31  The pamphlets, books, and phonograph records 
intended for a potential convert pointed out the perceived errors of other religions and 
then summarized the Jehovah’s Witness perspective.32 The Cantwells brought this kind of 
anti-Catholic material to Cassius Street.  While some observers33 might simply consider 
the texts and recordings as being in bad taste, the Catholics who encountered the 
Cantwell’s missionary materials viewed them as blasphemous. The Cantwells took these 
materials door-to-door, attempting not only to change the minds of Roman Catholics 
about the validity of their tradition, but also to sell them to the residents for small fees. 
Sales were evidently not their only goal, as they gave some of them away, if potential 
converts would accept the materials but could not pay.  
The Cantwell men proselytized and attempted to sell their materials without the 
locally required permits. A 1937 Connecticut law prohibited the solicitation of  “money, 
                                                
30 J.F. Rutherford, Cure, (Brooklyn, N.Y.: Watchtower Bible and Tract Society, 1938), 6. 
31 Cantwell v. State of Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). Transcript Of Record. 45. 
32 Shawn Francis Peters, Judging Jehovah’s Witnesses: Religious Persecution and the Dawn of the Rights 
Revolution (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2000): 1-2. 
33 See the unanimous opinion in Cantwell v. Connecticut 310 U.S. 296 (1940). 
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services, subscriptions or any valuable thing for any alleged religious, charitable or 
philanthropic cause,” from non-members of the organization unless the secretary of the 
public welfare council approved the cause. This law granted the secretary the power to 
determine “whether such cause is a religious one or is a bona fide object of charity or 
philanthropy and conforms to reasonable standards of efficiency and integrity.”34 Similar 
laws could be found in other states across the U.S. The asserted rationale for these laws 
was to protect consumers. Lawmakers occasionally cited Jehovah’s Witnesses in the 
creation of these laws around the country.  This was the case with a law passed in 
Waynoka, Oklahoma.35 By requiring certificates for door-to-door salesmen, a state hoped 
to remove the risk of charlatans pedaling ineffective medicines, people posing as 
members of religious groups, or pedestrians promoting money-making schemes in the 
name of a charitable institution.  In the Cantwell situation, the Connecticut law made it 
difficult for them to deliver their message without asking for permission from the 
government.  
To some contemporary readers, the ordinances restricting proselytizing on a 
public sidewalk might appear to be in direct conflict with the First Amendment’s free 
speech and free exercise of religion clauses. At the time, though, the Bill of Rights, the 
first ten amendments to the Constitution, explicitly directed their power to the federal 
government and not to states. As originally interpreted, this meant that the protection of 
the Bill of Rights only restricted the federal government while states could conceivably 
                                                
34 General Statutes of the State of Connecticut Section 6294, 1937. 
35 Jennifer Jacobs Henderson, “The Jehovah’s Witnesses,” 814-815. 
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do the opposite.36 For example, while the federal government could not establish 
Christianity, or any other faith, as the state religion, a single state could determine for 
itself an established religion if it so desired.  Some of the original states that signed onto 
this Constitution originally, including Massachusetts, joined with established state 
churches. By 1833, all states had disestablished their official state religions, but not 
because the U.S. Constitution required them to do so. Many states incorporated religious 
freedom principles similar to those in the U.S. Constitution in their state constitutions. 
Connecticut was no exception. The Connecticut Constitution declared, “The exercise and 
enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination, shall forever be 
free to all persons in the state; provided, that the right hereby declared and established, 
shall not be so construed as to excuse acts of licentiousness, or to justify practices 
inconsistent with the peace and safety of the state.”37 As the language of the section 
implies, public order was a major concern for Connecticut. Public order considerations 
could limit protection of religious practice.  This concept of limited rights has precedent. 
Occasionally, during wartime, the federal government and state governments, supported 
measures that restricted speech for both national security and public order.38 
Due to this concern with public order regarding religion and speech, police 
officers in New Haven took issue with and arrested the Cantwells.39 Jesse Cantwell’s 
interaction with two young men particularly troubled police officers in that context. Jesse 
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encountered John J. Ganley and John Cafferty, two men in their late twenties who grew 
up on that street, worked for steam railroad companies as a lamp man and shop hand, 
respectively, and attended nearby St. Peter’s Catholic Church. Ganley and Cafferty 
allowed Jesse to play the “Enemies” record for them on the sidewalk. Ganley and 
Cafferty grew upset with the messages they heard.  They asked Jesse to leave. Jesse then 
moved on to the next house and left Ganley and Cafferty behind. Ganley and Cafferty, 
incensed by Jesse’s message, claimed during the trial that they were tempted to use force 
to make Jesse leave – which would have been a clear breach of peace according to 
Connecticut law – but did not.40 It is unclear whether Ganley and Cafferty did not use 
force because Jesse left without an argument, because they did not want to get in trouble 
for breaching the peace themselves, or if there was some other reason.  
Russell visited the Hickey residence. Alice, the young Catholic daughter of two 
Irish immigrants, answered the door. Although Alice did not purchase a book, Russell left 
a pamphlet with her. Subsequently she tore it up. Later, one of the Cassius Street 
residents, Anna Rigby, found Russell’s message and the book’s interpretation so 
offensive, that after he left her house, she called the police. Then, court records show, 
things happened quickly. Leslie Leigh, a motorcycle police officer, who was Catholic, 
first questioned Russell Cantwell. Russell claimed to preach the word of God. After more 
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dollars, or imprisoned in jail not more than one year or both.” 
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discussion, Leigh called fellow police officer (and fellow Catholic), Henry Carnigan, to 
come with a radio car, and take Russell to the police station for more questioning. Unlike 
the other police officers involved, who lived much further away from their beat, Carnigan 
lived only five blocks away, and attended the same parish as the residents of Cassius 
Street.  Carnigan lived one block from St. Peter’s. 
After Carnigan arrested Russell and dropped him off at the Howard Avenue 
Station a block away, he returned to the street. He found the Cantwell’s car. The father, 
Newton, returned there and met his wife Esther who waited there for her family. When 
Carnigan found similar materials in the car as he had found in Russell’s possession, he 
took Newton into custody and brought him to the Howard Avenue Police Station as well. 
Gladys Barry, another Catholic housewife, encountered Jesse on her porch. She saw his 
brother get picked up by the cops at the other end of the street and suggested that he 
“scram.” Jesse did not get out quickly enough and was also arrested and brought into the 
Howard Avenue Station.  
The New Haven police charged the Cantwell men with violating two Connecticut 
laws. First, according to the police, the Cantwells solicited for philanthropic purposes 
without permission.41 In addition, the police cited a state statute on breach of peace when 
arresting the Cantwells.42   
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ANTI-CATHOLIC SENTIMENT 
Roman Catholics were the largest single denomination in the United States and 
Connecticut. Nevertheless, they were a minority when compared to the combined census 
total of the Protestant denominations in the United States. Catholics in Connecticut far 
outnumbered any other religious denomination in Connecticut with over 600,000 
members – a huge margin in a state that only claimed slightly over one million religious 
memberships overall.43 Jehovah’s Witnesses, on the other hand, were not even counted in 
the federal religious census of 1936 because it was among new “movements and cults” 
not well organized enough, according to the Census Bureau, to have reliable or easily 
attained membership statistics.44  
The Catholics on Cassius Street may well have been like many Catholics around 
the country who were still reeling from the widespread anti-Catholic sentiment of the 
1920s. According to religion scholar, Thomas A. Tweed, anti-Catholic sentiment in the 
United States as a whole surged in the 1920s due to increased Catholic immigration.45 
Philip Jenkins claimed that all classes of American society participated in anti-Catholic 
rhetoric with elites critiquing the perceived lack of autonomy and repressiveness of the 
Catholic Church, while lower classes of generally Protestant American society vied for 
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jobs with Catholic counterparts.46 From the somewhat unreliable data found in the 
Federal Census on Religious Bodies, the Roman Catholic Church experienced significant 
growth in the 1920s that slowed in the 1930s. From 1916 to 1926, the Catholic Church 
increased by 2.9 million members.47 Anti-Catholic organizations, such as the Klu Klux, 
also grew.  In the 1920s the Klan gained widespread support, peaking membership 
numbers in 1923, even north of the Mason-Dixon Line, including Connecticut.48  
Other immigrants were feared, but for many Anglo-Saxon Protestants, Catholics 
were particularly problematic. Nativists worried that U.S. Catholics offered allegiance to 
the Pope. Many Protestants, including Jehovah’s Witnesses, questioned whether 
Catholics could be effective and loyal citizens. Al Smith’s campaign for president in 
1928, as a “wet” anti-Prohibition Catholic, against a “dry” Quaker Herbert Hoover, 
provoked acrimonious campaigning focusing on Smith’s Catholicism as a trait 
unacceptable in an American President.49  During this period, Protestants opposed 
American Catholics’ pleas for military intervention in Mexico, where the secularist 
government purged itself of clerical influence in government.50  
In contrast to the growth in the first decades of the twentieth century, the Catholic 
population only jumped by 1.3 million from 1926 to 1936, due to immigration 
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restrictions and economic depression.51 While the Klan’s power waned by the end of the 
1920s, other forms of anti-Catholicism continued. By the 1930s and beyond into the 
1940s, other religions joined with Jehovah’s Witnesses to accuse Catholics of being un-
American and having sympathy for totalitarianism.52 Many Protestants also perceived a 
“powerful Catholic tilt of both [Hitler and Franco’s] regimes.”53 So the Catholics on 
Cassius Street likely had heard similar claims that  “Fascism and Nazi-ism [sic] and 
Roman Catholicism, meaning one and the same thing under three names, operate 
constantly to persecute the witnesses of Jehovah, the true followers of Jesus Christ.”54 
Even though such comparisons were common, however, it certainly did not mean that 
Catholics viewed this sentiment as benign or that they expected that message to be 
delivered to their doorstep.  In 1938, when the Cantwells went to Cassius Street, many of 
the longer-term Catholic residents may have remembered those earlier days with more 
pervasive anti-Catholic notions, making the Cantwells’ messages worrisome, even 
threatening. So the Cantwells found themselves in the Court of Common Pleas of New 
Haven County to answer the charges.  
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Chapter 2: The State Court Decisions 
THE NEW HAVEN TRIAL: GUILTY 
The Cantwells went to trial in New Haven, Connecticut, in September 1938.  
They fared poorly. The narratives of the local Catholic majority dominated the record – 
from witnesses to police officers, even the judge deciding the case. The Cantwells were 
convicted of both failing to get the proper permissions to solicit and disturbing the peace.  
The Cantwells received support from the Jehovah’s Witness hierarchy to continue 
their legal battle.  This case eventually became one of the 38 cases Jehovah’s Witnesses 
brought to the Supreme Court. 55 There was little in the record of this local case to 
indicate that this would be the first free exercise case of all those brought forward to 
reach the Supreme Court. A possible explanation is that the Jehovah’s Witness chief 
counsel, Olin R. Moyle, argued this case on behalf of the Cantwells.56 It is unclear why 
Moyle took this case, rather than some of the others that emerged around the country, but 
it could have been due to the exemplary issues brought by the Connecticut laws that 
would challenge both local laws and the U.S. Constitution for other municipalities around 
the country. Another possibility is simply that New Haven was easily accessed by Moyle 
from the Jehovah’s Witnesses’ headquarters in Brooklyn, New York.  
In any case, the Cantwells went on trial in a Connecticut court, the Court of 
Common Pleas of New Haven County.  There, Moyle argued using principles from the 
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56 Cantwell v. State of Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). Transcript Of Record, 5. 
 23 
Connecticut Constitution. Moyle invoked the U.S. Constitution’s Fourteenth 
Amendment’s “due process clause,” a tact the U.S. Supreme Court had just begun to use 
in interpretation of civil liberties protected by the Constitution. The Judge at the Court of 
Common Pleas, Raymond J. Devlin (1898-1986) decided the case based only on the state 
laws cited by the prosecutors. He did not consider the Fourteenth Amendment since the 
Supreme Court had not yet ruled on whether the religion clauses applied to state law. 
Nine people testified. The witnesses included three police officers, five Cassius Street 
residents, and Esther Cantwell, the wife and mother of the proselytizing Cantwells. 
Esther could only testify with regard to her sons, as marital privilege allowed her to avoid 
testimony that might incriminate her husband. 
The prosecuting lawyer, Edwin S. Pickett,57 asked each of the witnesses with 
which religion they affiliated. Pickett highlighted the residents’ religion as particularly 
important to his argument that the Cantwells breached the peace by circulating anti-
Catholic materials. For Pickett the local factors mattered. Through the testimonies the 
Judge learned that, with the exception of Esther Cantwell, the police officers and all other 
witnesses were Roman Catholic. Since they were neighbors and since Catholic 
ecclesiastical organization worked according to parish boundaries, they all attended St. 
Peter’s, the parish located four blocks away. Many claimed to be very devout but did not 
expand on what that meant for them. All the witnesses stated they were lifelong 
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Catholics. It is not clear why Pickett asked about the police officers’ religious affiliation, 
as there was no record or insinuation of the Cantwells proselytizing to the police. 
Regardless of the intent, the questioning further established the local context of Cassius 
Street and its surrounding blocks as Roman Catholic. 
Throughout his questioning of witnesses, Pickett read aloud excerpts from 
materials confiscated from the Cantwells as evidence. Although the defending lawyers, 
Otto LaMacchia and Olin R. Moyle, frequently objected to Pickett’s interjections, Judge 
Devlin allowed Pickett to continue.58 In these readings, Pickett quoted some of the most 
incendiary language. For example, he read “Fraudulently and hypocritically operating in 
the name of God and of Christ, the Catholic religious organization has continually carried 
on a campaign of intolerance toward and persecution of all persons who have tried to 
understand the Bible and teach its truth to others.”59  
Judge Devlin came from a Catholic background as well. He lived on a street 
named Parker Place, where the majority of residents, Devlin included, descended from 
parents born in the United States and held white-collar jobs.60 Devlin’s grandparents on 
both sides of his family came to the United States from Ireland. Although not all Irish 
immigrants were Catholic, the largest proportions were. Devlin grew up in a large family, 
which was common among Catholics. Both his wife and his daughter had Catholic 
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burials, a rite reserved for Catholic parish members.61  These facts suggest that that Judge 
Devlin also identified with Catholicism. Judge Devlin’s affiliation with Catholicism was 
significant, because Pickett’s quotations from Jehovah’s Witness materials—“Satan has 
developed and been built up the Hierarchy of the Catholic Church”—could have offended 
the judge, just as it had the Catholic witnesses.62 Judge Devlin’s religious affiliation was 
not the only reason for finding the Cantwell men guilty. The Cantwells clearly did not 
have the necessary permit and their activity provoked some type of disturbance.  In any 
event, Judge Devlin ruled that the three Cantwell men violated both laws. Judge Devlin 
then fined each Cantwell man ten dollars, but without any jail time, a punishment 
significantly lower than allowed by either law on its own, and ordered them to stop 
soliciting during the appeals process.63  Despite the relatively minor penalty assessed, the 
case did not end with Devlin’s ruling. The Cantwells’ lawyers made it clear that they 
planned to appeal. 
THE STATE APPEAL: UPHELD 
With support from the Jehovah’s Witnesses headquarters’ legal counsel, Olin R. 
Moyle, the Cantwells continued their effort to reverse the judgment of the lower court by 
appealing to the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut. They contested all the charges. 
They also claimed that the cited laws violated both the Connecticut and United States 
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Constitutions, in line with a newly emerging form of interpretation that had not yet made 
it to every lower court in the country. The Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut only 
saw a potential problem with the lower court decision on the disturbance of peace for 
Newton and Russell Cantwell. It was Jesse Cantwell, alone, who caused John Ganley and 
John Cafferty to have to restrain themselves from inflicting violence. Because Jesse 
angered witnesses to an extreme degree, the Connecticut Supreme Court agreed with the 
decision of Judge Devlin in convicting Jesse Cantwell on the charge of disturbing peace. 
Although Newton and Russell Cantwell performed many of the same actions as Jesse, no 
witnesses testified extreme anger and willingness to commit violence as a result of the 
actions of the older two Cantwells. The Connecticut Supreme Court ordered that a new 
trial inquire whether evidence existed to support the conviction of Newton and Russell on 
the charge of breaching public peace.  
 The new trial never occurred. The Cantwell’s filed again, asking for a re-
argument for the entire case, not just the public disturbance of Newton and Russell.64 
When the Connecticut Supreme Court refused to grant the Cantwell’s request, the 
Jehovah’s Witnesses sent their case to the United States Supreme Court to try to appeal to 
the highest court in the land and highlight First Amendment issues.65  The case was 
accepted.  
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Incorporation Doctrine 
The Supreme Court’s analysis of the case will be discussed in greater detail 
below, but we must first consider why the lower courts judges did not decide that the 
Jehovah’s Witnesses had a right to the free exercise of religion and free speech. The 
answer lies within the U.S. Constitution and the way the Supreme Court traditionally 
interpreted its first ten amendments. According to Constitutional scholar and former 
federal judge, Michael McConnell, “the Bill of Rights added to the Constitution in 1791 
was designed to limit the power of the federal government that the Constitution had 
created.”66 The language of the First Amendment states, “Congress shall make no law…” 
(ital. added). The Supreme Court initially used this line of reasoning to limit its own 
authority to those cases dealing with laws made by the U.S. Congress.  In 1833, the 
Supreme Court rejected a claim made against a city under just compensation of the Fifth 
Amendment in Barron v. Baltimore.67 The court asserted it could not rule on an action by 
a city.  Similarly, in 1845 the Supreme Court deemed the religious free exercise clause of 
the First Amendment as only applicable to the federal government in Permoli v. New 
Orleans. The City of New Orleans enacted an ordinance restricting where corpses could 
be exposed within the city – restricting them to funerary chapels.68 A Catholic priest, 
Permoli, received a fine for defying this ordinance and saying prayers over a corpse in a 
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non-approved location – the church in which he was a priest.69  In spite of his claim, the 
Supreme Court denied Permoli’s petition that the city ordinance violated Permoli’s First 
Amendment rights since, Justice Catron stated:  
The Constitution makes no provision for protecting the citizens of the respective 
states in their religious liberties; this is left to the state constitutions and laws: nor 
is there any inhibition imposed by the Constitution of the United States in this 
respect on the states.70  
The Court in 1845 flatly denied that a city ordinance or state could violate the Free 
Exercise clause. This interpretation remained until the Cantwell case.  
Cases before Cantwell that can be thought of dealing with free exercise, such as 
Reynolds v. United States from 1878, did not concern the states. The Reynolds case dealt 
with the Utah Territory and the Latter-day Saint practice at the time of plural marriage.71 
Because Congress made laws prohibiting bigamy, the Supreme Court, then, took the case 
to determine whether or not those laws violated the free exercise of religion protected by 
the Constitution for polygamists living Utah.72 Utah was still a territory at that time.  For 
example, if the Reynolds case had been in Georgia, already a state in 1878, the case 
would likely not have met the same fate. 
 This line of interpretation changed in light of the Fourteenth Amendment and new 
figures on the Supreme Court. The Fourteenth Amendment prohibited states from 
“depriv[ing] any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” 
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Although the Fourteenth Amendment was approved in 1868, it took until the twentieth 
century for the Supreme Court to deem that the due process clause offered a way of 
extending rights from the Bill of Rights to states.  
The path by which the Supreme Court incorporated free exercise of religion was 
somewhat meandering. In 1925, the Supreme Court decided that the due process clause 
invalidated a compulsory public education law in Oregon that prohibited the use of 
parochial schools as a substitute for public schooling. This case, Pierce v. Society of 
Sisters, did not state that the Bill of Rights was applicable, but instead stated that “rights 
guaranteed by the Constitution may not be abridged by legislation which has no 
reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of the state.”73 The Court 
claimed that the State of Oregon needed a better reason for compelling students to attend 
public schools rather than any other school, as it impeded parents’ decisions about 
training their children for a profession. Although one of the schools that petitioned in 
Pierce was a Catholic parochial school, economic liberty, not religious freedom, was the 
deciding factor cited.74  
The first case in which the Supreme Court incorporated a Bill of Rights freedom 
was Gitlow v. New York in 1925.75 Gitlow, a socialist anarchist, had been “tried, 
convicted, and sentenced to imprisonment,” under a New York State law prohibiting 
anyone from advocating criminal anarchy.76 New York defined advocating for criminal 
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anarchy in an expansive way, so it included written, spoken, and published advocacy of 
the violent and unlawful overthrow of the government. In its decision, the Supreme Court 
allowed for attempts at keeping anarchy at bay. But, it found that New York State went 
too far in infringing upon Gitlow’s right to speak. Thus, the Court concluded that:   
For present purposes we may and do assume that freedom of speech and of the 
press-which are protected by the First Amendment from abridgment by Congress-
are among the fundamental personal rights and 'liberties' protected by the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States.77  
This statement became known as the incorporation doctrine. Through this reasoning, the 
Supreme Court could choose to incorporate what it deemed as “fundamental personal 
rights and ‘liberties’” that could be applied to the states through the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s due process clause. The Supreme Court also ruled for the incorporation of 
prior restraint of the press and freedom of assembly in Near v. Minnesota in 1931 and 
DeJonge v. Oregon in 1937 respectively.78 In Cantwell, Moyle claimed from the 
beginning of the judicial process that the Connecticut law violated the U.S. Constitution’s 
due process clause.  This was Moyle’s attempt to make judges incorporate free exercise 
of religion. 
 For the purposes of the Cantwell case, at the state and county levels, the issues 
raised in the case did not concern the U.S. Constitution, because free exercise of religion 
remained a federal issue. The courts that initially ruled against the Cantwells were state 
courts – not federal—and so it is understandable that they did not concern themselves 
with attempting to incorporate free exercise of religion to their own jurisdictions. These 
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courts did not have the power to do so. It took an appeal to the Supreme Court of the 
United States for the Cantwells and their Jehovah’s Witness legal team to force a decision 
as to whether or not the free exercise of religion counted as one of those “fundamental 
personal rights and ‘liberties’” to apply to states.  
Jehovah’s Witnesses: Their National Agenda 
 Joseph F. Rutherford, the leader of the Jehovah’s Witnesses, worked toward 
expansions in the definitions of religious freedom, speech, and public assembly for 
citizens of the United States, but particularly for Jehovah’s Witnesses. Olin Moyle did 
not continue arguing the case at the Supreme Court, because of a falling out with 
Rutherford.79 Hayden Covington, a lawyer from Texas, took over as the Jehovah’s 
Witnesses’ chief counsel and remained with the group as their primary lawyer for 
decades.80  
Across the country, Jehovah’s Witnesses between the 1930s and the 1950s 
brought 38 cases to the Supreme Court to gain protection through the Bill of Rights.81 
The Cantwell case was one of those 38 cases.  They did not always win. In 1940, the 
same year that Cantwell made its way to the Supreme Court docket, Rutherford 
personally argued against compulsory flag salutes in front of the Supreme Court. He was 
forced to do this because he did not have other legal counsel at that time. Rutherford also 
gave the oral argument for Minersville School District v. Gobitis. Rutherford was not 
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without qualification, as he had served as chief counsel for Jehovah’s Witnesses before 
gaining the presidency in 1907.82 But, Rutherford lost the case, resulting in teachers and 
principals around the country compelling Jehovah’s Witness school children to 
participate in flag salutes. Covington soon took the helm, and argued on behalf of the 
Cantwells before the Supreme Court, as I note when I analyze the case in greater detail 
below. In 1941, Cox v. New Hampshire, Jehovah’s Witnesses conducted a parade without 
a permit and claimed free exercise and freedom of assembly protection. The Jehovah’s 
Witnesses lost, because the Court stated that licenses for parades are an important part of 
a city’s ability to regulate safety and pay for the extra policing a gathering like a parade 
might require.83 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire stated that restricting speech meant to 
incite violence or hatred in the listener was deemed to be acceptable despite free speech 
claims of a Jehovah’s Witness.84 They did not lose them all, however.  The ruling in 
1943’s Murdock v. Pennsylvania supported the Jehovah’s Witnesses’ argument that their 
free exercise was limited by a law requiring them to purchase a license to solicit.85  
 These cases were part of a determined effort by Rutherford and the Jehovah’s 
Witnesses to expand First Amendment freedoms. While individuals from other religious 
communities brought forward similar cases, Jehovah’s Witnesses’ extensive legal team 
uniquely aided their cause. This legal team helped push and support their cases beyond 
the local level of the judiciary with qualified counsel and financial backing. However, the 
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fight for religious freedom did not always involve the courts. As early as 1934, Judge 
Rutherford published pamphlets and made radio broadcasts challenging the status quo of 
religious freedom in the United States. In one broadcast that was later republished in 
pamphlet form, “Truth: Shall it be Suppressed or Will Congress Protect the People’s 
Rights?.” Rutherford challenged radio stations that banned his programs from the air and 
insinuated that the Catholic hierarchy had pulled the strings behind the scenes to make 
that happen. This fight against censorship on radio waves went before Congress. In a 
Congressional hearing on the issue, Jehovah’s Witnesses testified that they were 
prohibited from purchasing airtime on major networks.86  
In those earlier broadcasts and pamphlets, a Jehovah’s Witnesses battle with 
Roman Catholics was apparent. Using his interpretation of the Bible, Rutherford wrote, 
“a conspiracy is formed by Satan and his crowd, including the Roman Catholic hierarchy 
and other religionists to kill those who faithfully praise the name of Jehovah.”87 
Rutherford claimed that the Roman Catholic hierarchy “is now carrying on a subtle and 
deceptive campaign to gain complete control of the United States government.”88 And 
further the “Roman Catholic Hierarchy is now attempting to gain control of all the radio 
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facilities and to suppress liberty of conscience, freedom of speech and freedom of the 
press in the United States.”89  
 Rutherford’s reading of scripture, of course, differed from that of the Catholic 
hierarchy, as well as the lay Catholics who followed the Church’s teachings. Some lay 
Catholics got involved in this fight around the country. The Knights of Columbus, the 
Catholic fraternal organization founded in New Haven in 1882, spearheaded some of 
these efforts.90 In Indianapolis, a Grand Knight (a leader) helped start a protest against 
Rutherford’s broadcasts on a local station.91 Due to citizen protests, broadcast 
organizations, including many Catholic run stations in Denver, Colorado Springs, and 
Oklahoma City removed Jehovah’s Witness material from radio waves.92 Some clergy 
got involved with those protests. For example, the prolific apologist, Reverend Herbert 
Thurston, S.J. (1856-1934), who also warned Catholics about other new religious 
movements like Spiritualism, Theosophy, and Christian Science, published a 1939 
pamphlet, “Rutherford and the Witnesses of Jehovah: Are They Apostles of Anarchy?”93 
Other pamphlets written by Thurston denounced Rutherford, questioned the origins of the 
movement, and revealed the truth behind Rutherford’s common title, “Judge Rutherford.” 
Thurston plainly denounced Rutherford by stating, “Rutherford is not a judge, nor even 
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an ex-Judge. He has never received any such official appointment.”94 Rutherford’s 
attacks on Catholicism “take us back to the language and type of caricature favoured [sic] 
by Martin Luther and the Reformers of his day.”95  Like the Jehovah’s Witnesses 
materials, these Catholic pamphlets were available for a small fee – ten cents.96  
The Cantwell men continued to appeal their case after the Connecticut Supreme 
Court of Errors refused to decide on the basis of free exercise of religion in June of 
1939.97 Although the Cantwells’ legal team filed for the case to be reargued in September 
to the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut, they were denied in October.98 By 
December, the Jehovah’s Witness legal team filed all the appropriate paperwork to have 
the U.S. Supreme Court consider the case for a writ of certiorari (the official term for the 
Supreme Court agreeing to hear a case).99 In February, the U.S. Supreme Court granted 
the writ of certiorari and agreed to hear oral arguments. As I will show, all these details 
about the local, state, and national scene provide the wider cultural context for a more 
textured analysis of the case, but the Supreme Court’s composition and history should 
still be considered.  
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Chapter 3:  The Federal Case at the Supreme Court 
RELEVANT SUPREME COURT HISTORY AND THE KEY JUSTICES 
In the aftermath of the Civil War, Congress and the States added new 
amendments to the Constitution. One post-Civil-War addition, the Fourteenth 
Amendment, opened up possibilities for the Supreme Court to assert itself by 
incorporating sections of the Bill of Rights to the states.  The question presented by the 
Fourteenth Amendment was how equal protection under the law for all citizens could be 
assured if a state or local government was free to have laws that limited those 
protections?  But, the Supreme Court did not enter a new, activist phase in its history 
until the interwar period, the time between World War I and World War II. The 
Fourteenth Amendment had made incorporation possible, but the opportunity was not 
exploited until the 1930s and early 1940s.   
The 1930s and 1940s were also the era of the New Deal, the massive legislative 
agenda that expanded the federal government and transformed the nation, though not 
without some opposition from the judicial branch.  The Supreme Court evaluated the 
constitutionality of many New Deal proposals and played a significant role in controlling 
the new policies. During Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s first term, the Supreme Court, with 
many conservative justices, invalidated many of the New Deal efforts he helped usher 
through Congress. On one single day, May 27, 1935, the Supreme Court handed down 
three unanimous decisions that dismantled various parts of the New Deal.100 In an attempt 
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to control the Court, Roosevelt advocated for the Judicial Procedures Reform Bill of 
1937. This legislation proposed adding a maximum of six justices to the Supreme Court -
- one for every justice over the age of seventy. That meant Roosevelt could have named 
six justices and that would have virtually assured the Court would rule in his favor.  
Although this plan had been brewing in the Roosevelt White House for some time, its 
appearance at this moment in history was striking.101 Roosevelt had just won reelection 
for a second term, receiving over 60 percent of the vote.  He proposed this plan to add 
justices to the Court in an attempt to protect his New Deal and presidential legacy. The 
Court in the 1930s lost much popularity with the American public due to their opposition 
to key elements of New Deal. Popular news media portrayed the mostly elderly Supreme 
Court Justices as “nine old men,” a phrase popularized by the 1936 exposé bestseller by 
Drew Pearson and Robert S. Allen.102  
Historians credit Associate Justice Owen Roberts with contesting Roosevelt’s 
plans and saving the nine-person court, rather than changing to a larger court.103 Justice 
Roberts typically sided with the anti-New Deal 5-4 majority. But, one month after the 
announcement of the “court packing” plan, as the Judicial Procedures Reform Bill of 
1937 was commonly known, Roberts switched allegiances, giving the pro-New Deal 
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justices the 5-4 majority in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish.104  The case was cited as the 
“switch in time that saved nine.”105 Given the West Hotel Co. decision, Roosevelt’s plan 
lost momentum and the court’s traditional nine-member construction remained. This left 
the Supreme Court stronger than ever. 
Robert’s ideological switch also marked the beginning of a new era in the Court 
marked by pro-New Deal decisions and an expansion of civil liberties. The Supreme 
Court upheld the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, a key New Deal law, in United States 
v. F.W. Darby Lumber Company.106 In May of 1937, the conservative justice Willis Van 
Devanter resigned, allowing President Roosevelt to appoint his first candidate, Hugo 
Black.107 Due to Roosevelt’s long tenure in office, he eventually appointed eight men to 
the Supreme Court, five of whom remained on the Court by the time of the oral argument 
of the Cantwell case. 
When the Court heard the Cantwell case in 1940, a few justices had backgrounds 
that might have affected the way they ruled. Because of a lack of transparency in the 
operations of the Court, we have no definitive proof of bias. However, the Court, 
although unanimous in their ruling on the Cantwell case, was not a monolithic or neutral 
arbiter. Some demographic facts and judicial trends in other decisions might help to 
describe the 1940 Court that heard the Cantwell case. The Court included seven 
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Protestants, one Jew, and one Catholic. Owen Roberts, the Justice who was credited with 
saving the nine-member court, wrote the Cantwell opinion. The opinion by that devout 
Episcopalian documented the position of that unanimous court and incorporated the free 
exercise clause to the states.108 Of the other Protestants, two are noteworthy. James C. 
McReynolds was a fundamentalist Disciples of Christ member and an ardent anti-Semite 
who treated fellow Jewish Supreme Court Justices with contempt. It is unclear whether 
that vitriol extended to Catholicism or Jehovah’s Witnesses, the religions involved in 
Cantwell.109 In contrast, Harlan F. Stone was known for supporting minority rights. In a 
1938 case concerning interstate milk shipments, Justice Stone argued for a “more 
searching judicial inquiry” in cases of prejudice against religious, national, or racial 
minorities.110 In the same year as Cantwell, only Justice Stone sided with the Jehovah’s 
Witnesses on another case, Minersville School District v. Gobitis. In the Gobitis case, the 
majority upheld compulsory flag salutes in schools to the chagrin of Jehovah’s Witness 
children and parents.  This religious minority interpreted flag salutes as a form of 
idolatry. Justice Stone gave the only dissent, arguing that school boards could employ 
other means to instill patriotism other than an act that violated the religious conscience of 
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some students.111 (He was vindicated three years later when the Supreme Court 
overturned Gobitis in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette.)112  
Frank Murphy, the only Catholic on the Court, joined in 1940. Roosevelt 
nominated Murphy, which was not surprising since the new Justice had previously shown 
his loyalty to the New Deal and Roosevelt’s efforts through his work as mayor of Detroit 
and later U.S. Attorney General. Murphy created the Civil Rights Division of the 
Department of Justice. He ended up on the Supreme Court after the Court decided to hear 
the Cantwell case, but before the oral argument and decision were made. Historians grant 
that Murphy, unsure about his own qualifications for the Court, did not become a strong 
character on the court until 1941, when he self-consciously claimed that his position 
required him “to enlarge men’s freedoms and make them content with justice.”113 
 So the Cantwell case arrived at the recently strengthened Supreme Court in front 
of these predominantly Protestant justices. Their religious backgrounds contrasted with 
the overwhelmingly Catholic heritage of those involved in the Connecticut ruling. 
Additionally, with several of the justices who had opposed the New Deal now off the 
Court and five of Roosevelt’s picks serving, the federal Court was empowered to take the 
Constitution into a new phase of interpretation with the Fourteenth Amendment to fortify 
it. 
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WHY THIS CASE REACHED THE SUPREME COURT 
Why the Supreme Court takes some cases and refuses others has often baffled 
observers.  As unlikely as it might have seemed to some contemporaries, these seemingly 
trivial events in New Haven, Connecticut, reached the Supreme Court and changed the 
way the United States assured free exercise of religion.  Jehovah’s Witnesses, as I have 
suggested, were particularly litigious in many parts of the United States at the time. 
Under the direction of their leader, Judge Rutherford, Witnesses attempted to push the 
limits of acceptable religious practice and speech in the public sphere. The Justices of the 
Supreme Court did not take the case, nor did the Jehovah’s Witnesses hierarchy support 
the appeal to overturn a $10 fine imposed on a family. The Jehovah’s Witnesses 
hierarchy backed the Cantwell family and assigned their chief counsel to the case to 
protect their right to proselytize, which they held as critical to their ability to freely 
exercise their religion.  The Cantwell family’s troubles were merely the vehicle to pursue 
that broader political agenda.  
At the same time, the Supreme Court was on a new trajectory; it had a more 
expansive view of First Amendment freedoms. In 1925’s Gitlow case, the Supreme Court 
incorporated freedom of speech and press to states.114 In 1938, the year New Haven 
police officers arrested the Cantwells for distributing religious messages without a permit 
and disturbing peace, the Supreme Court upheld freedom of the press as an important 
principle for states to follow in another Jehovah’s Witness case, Lovell v. City of 
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Griffin.115 In Lovell, that Georgia’s city ordinance required written permission from the 
city manager to distribute literature for free or fee. Chief Justice Hughes wrote the only 
opinion of Lovell. He stated that the Griffin ordinance was too broad, covering virtually 
any type of press distribution. Hughes claimed that, “its character is such that it strikes at 
the very foundation of the freedom of the press by subjecting it to license and 
censorship.” 
In 1939, some Jehovah’s Witnesses were back in front of the Supreme Court as 
one party in Schneider v. State of New Jersey, a case that combined four similar appeals 
from New Jersey, California, Wisconsin, and Massachusetts. In each location, ordinances 
prohibited the public distribution of pamphlets, handbills, and flyers. Only Clara 
Schneider, in New Jersey, was a Jehovah’s Witness. Like the Cantwells, Schneider went 
door to door with pamphlets published by the Watchtower Society, urging readers to join 
the movement. The other conjoined cases did not include religious components at all. 
Instead, they involved pamphlets for a butcher’s union, a labor protest meeting dealing 
with unemployment insurance, and a program with testimonies from people who 
advocated against General Francisco Franco in the Spanish Civil War.116 The Supreme 
Court took these four cases together. Justice Owen Roberts, who later authored the 
Cantwell opinion, wrote the Schneider opinion. Roberts echoed Hughes’ sentiment in the 
Lovell case. Roberts reiterated that freedoms of speech and the press were important 
                                                
115 Lovel v. City of Griffin, Georgia 303 U.S. 444 (1938). 
116 Schneider v. State of N J, Town of Irvington, 308 U.S. 147 (1939). TRANSCRIPT OF RECORD. File 
Date: 3/1/1939. 26 pp. U.S. Supreme Court Records and Briefs, 1832-1978. Gale, Cengage Learning. 
University of Texas at Austin - Law. 17 March 2014 
http://galenet.galegroup.com/servlet/SCRB?uid=0&srchtp=a&ste=14&rcn=DW3908181862, 
 43 
liberties, and that the ordinances involved in all four cases before the Supreme Court 
were too expansive to be beneficial. According to Roberts, individuals had a right to be 
on the streets and disseminate information that expressed their views. If cities incurred 
problems from excess trash from the papers distributed, Roberts asserted, the cities had to 
bear that cost in order to preserve the more important rights of free speech and free press. 
Only Justice McReynolds, the frequently crabby conservative justice, dissented, but he 
did not write an opinion explaining his perspective. We cannot be sure if McReynold’s 
notoriety for opposing New Deal efforts with labor issues could have affected his 
dissent.117 
 The Cantwell case arrived at the court in this cultural and political context and 
had parallels with both the Lovell case and the Schneider case. As in Lovell and 
Schneider, the Cantwell men distributed Jehovah’s Witness pamphlets by going door-to-
door. The Cantwell’s situation differed slightly because the ordinances involved were 
much more specifically written than the previous cases. In those earlier cases, the 
Supreme Court had found unconstitutional prohibitions of distributing printed materials 
of any kind. In Connecticut, the lawmakers drew the laws more narrowly, only specifying 
solicitation for “religious, charitable or philanthropic cause.”118 This was a less 
generalized law and could have appeased Chief Justice Hughes’ concerns expressed in 
the Lovell case. Because Schneider had included non-religious pamphlets, the 
Connecticut case also brought to bear interesting new issues dealing with religion 
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specifically. In light of the burgeoning field of incorporation, the Cantwell case proved 
intriguing enough for the Supreme Court to accept it – granting it certiorari only three 
months after the Schneider case opinion was made public.  
ARGUMENT AT THE SUPREME COURT 
In their appeal to the Supreme Court, the Cantwells’ argument stated that 
Connecticut law and Constitution violated the Cantwell’s free exercise of religion as 
protected by the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, when impact of the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was considered. While that was also the 
original argument in the Connecticut cases, the judges had not considered that argument 
at all. Hayden Covington, chief counsel of the Jehovah’s Witnesses and lawyer for the 
Cantwells, claimed that the Connecticut laws requiring a license to solicit for religious 
purposes and limiting speech to prevent disruptions of the public order violated the 
constitutions of both Connecticut and the United States. According to Covington, 
Connecticut unconstitutionally restricted the Cantwell’s right to worship God as protected 
by free exercise clauses in those constitutions. When Chief Justice Hughes asked if there 
was “no limit at all on what you can do because you think you are worshipping God,” 
Covington replied, “there is no limit.”119 Justice Murphy, the only Catholic on the Court, 
remained mostly silent during oral arguments but asked if the principal purpose of going 
door to door was solicitation or “dissemination of ideas.” Although, the lower courts 
convicted the Cantwell’s because they violated Connecticut’s laws concerning door-to-
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door solicitation, Covington claimed that the Cantwell’s primary purpose was 
“dissemination of ideas.” According to Covington and the Cantwell’s written appeal to 
the Court, the religious worship activity of going door-to-door did not include “receipt of 
money.” Covington further argued that if public order limits on free speech were left in 
place, Republicans and Democrats could no longer speak out against one another.120 
Because the lower courts did not deal with the U.S. Constitution, the lawyers 
representing Connecticut made additional arguments to the Supreme Court Justices.121 
When arguing about the need for a certificate to solicit, the defense claimed “the purpose 
of the statute is to protect the public from fraud in solicitation of money or other 
valuables under the guise of religion.”122 This meant, the Connecticut lawyers suggested, 
that the Connecticut law did not deal with free speech, or inhibit “freedom to worship.” 
The defense also narrowly defined free exercise as “freedom to worship.” The defense 
argued that solicitation was not a “worship activity” and, therefore, that the Cantwells’ 
free exercise of religion – that is, freedom to worship—remained intact despite the 
certificate legislation. 
To argue that the Cantwells breached the peace, the Connecticut lawyers claimed 
that breaches of peace do not actually need to provoke violence. Instead, the defense cited 
several lower court cases where disruptions occurred despite a lack of violence.123 
Finally, the defense argued that religious justifications for breaching peace were 
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illegitimate. In order to support the claim that good order surpassed acts “claimed to have 
been motivated by religious belief,” the plaintiffs cited Reynolds v. United States.124 In 
the 1878 Reynolds case, the Supreme Court decided the free exercise clause did not 
excuse a Latter-day Saint’s practice of polygamy in the Utah territory in defiance of 
federal anti-bigamy laws. Here, the Court had made a distinction between belief and 
action, allowing the former and restricting the latter in particular cases.  
The questions for all involved in Cantwell were twofold. Would the Supreme 
Court decide that there was enough danger posed by the threat of violence by a sixteen 
year old to two Catholic men in their twenties to justify limiting speech? Did the 
Cantwell’s proselytizing count as a type of religious activity potentially protected by the 
free exercise clause on the national stage? As we have seen, the Supreme Court began 
incorporating various parts of the Bill of Rights to states, and Cantwell was an 
opportunity to continue that trend.  By accepting this case with religious freedom issues, 
when taken in context with the previous incorporation of free speech in Gitlow and 
freedom of the press in Schneider, a ruling on the free exercise of religion clause 
appeared inevitable.  
THE SUPREME COURT DECISION 
In a unanimous decision articulated by Justice Owen Roberts, the Supreme Court 
decided in favor of the Cantwell men. Yet this decision was not sweeping; it allowed 
certain restrictions on religious free exercise.  Roberts echoed principles from the 
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Reynolds case where an earlier Supreme Court had ruled that religious freedom of action 
was not absolute. In reference to the First Amendment, Justice Roberts wrote, “the 
Amendment embraces two concepts, freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is 
absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be.”125 For Justice Roberts, 
freedom of religion was primary, and any other right the state had to regulate must be 
weighed against the primary right of religious free exercise. Roberts described free 
exercise of religion as part of the “fundamental law” of the United States.126  
In his opinion, Justice Roberts maintained that states could regulate “the times, 
the places, and the manner of soliciting upon the streets,” as well as “safeguard the peace, 
good order, and comfort of the community, without unconstitutionally invading the 
liberties protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.”127 Justice Roberts did not agree with 
Covington that freedom of religious practice ought to be unlimited. However, Roberts 
found that the statute concerning the certificate to solicit placed the power to determine 
what constituted a legitimate religion into the hands of the secretary of public welfare. By 
the terms of the statute, Justice Roberts stated, the secretary of public welfare was granted 
too much power to distinguish a religious and a non-religious cause.128 Further, because 
the statue did not allow solicitation of funds from nonmembers, it prohibited 
proselytizing activities without a certificate. Justice Roberts viewed a potential rejection 
of a certificate as inhibiting the propagation of religious communities: “Such a censorship 
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of religion as the means of determining its right to survive is a denial of liberty protected 
by the First Amendment and included in the liberty which is within the protection of the 
Fourteenth.”129    
On the matter of the Connecticut statute on breaching peace, Justice Roberts 
reached a different conclusion than the courts below. After a preamble stating that, for the 
most part, the Supremes defer to the judgment of lower courts on more narrowly defined 
legislation, Justice Roberts proceeded to overturn the lower court decision on the grounds 
that the Connecticut statute was too broadly written. He pointed out that the Cantwell 
case dealt with “a statute sweeping in a great variety of conduct under a general and 
indefinite characterization, leaving to the executive and judicial branches too wide a 
discretion with regard to its application.” Justice Roberts more narrowly defined the 
statute for Connecticut to tell them what breach of peace did not include. He claimed that 
Jesse Cantwell “was upon a public street, where he had a right to be.” After asking two 
pedestrians to play a record, and receiving permission, Jesse played the record. 
Afterward, the hearers testified, as I noted earlier, that they “felt like hitting Cantwell” 
and wanted to “throw Cantwell off the street.” Although Justice Roberts acknowledged 
that the contents of the recording attacked the Roman Catholic Church in particular, he 
did not mention the listeners’ Catholicism. Roberts claimed that Jesse Cantwell did not 
“intend to insult or affront the hearers by playing the record,” and meant “no intentional 
discourtesy, no personal abuse.”130 Roberts instead claimed “it is plain that he [Jesse 
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Cantwell] wished only to interest them [John Ganley and John Cafferty] in his 
propaganda.”131 Although Justice Roberts admitted “the hearers were highly offended,” it 
made no difference to Justice Roberts’ decision making. Unlike judges in the lower 
courts who placed emphasis on the testimonies from offended Catholics, Justice Roberts 
did not focus on the feelings or beliefs of the local Catholics.  He was far more concerned 
with Jesse Cantwell’s conduct rather than “the effect of his communication upon his 
listeners.”132 Justice Roberts shrugged off the vilification of the Catholic Church on Jesse 
Cantwell’s record and implied that it was an “exaggeration.” “To persuade others to his 
own point of view, the pleader, as we know, at times, resorts to exaggeration, to 
vilification of men who have been, or are, prominent in church or state, and even to false 
statement.”133 Justice Roberts implied that the Cantwells’ message about Roman 
Catholicism was incorrect and that the Cantwells knew it. They simply used the 
vilification of Catholicism as a way to persuade their audience.  Justice Roberts closed 
his argument by articulating his general understanding of the protection of conflicting 
religious opinions as “essential to the enlightened opinion and right conduct on the part of 
the citizens of a democracy.”134 
In his decision, Justice Roberts did not address the question of the Connecticut 
Constitution. Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court historically lies in federal issues, not in 
state matters, but in some circumstances the Supreme Court does rule on state issues. By 
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limiting the scope, Roberts immediately obscured part of the local environment. Roberts 
did not address the questions of whether the laws were inconsistent with the Connecticut 
Constitution or if the Connecticut Constitution violated the U.S. Constitution. By not 
responding, Justice Roberts did not evaluate those sections in the Connecticut 
Constitution.  He also did not rule whether the Connecticut legislature acted consistently 
with its own state constitution. Of particular note, Justice Roberts left unanswered what 
freedom of religion means when limited by a clause in Connecticut’s Constitution 
protecting religious freedom yet prohibiting “practices inconsistent with the peace and 
safety of the state.”135 That phrase remains in the Connecticut Constitution today. 
Religious freedom with an explicit safety clause could have led to a different society than 
that developed through use of the religious freedom language in the First Amendment of 
the U.S. Constitution.136 
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THE IMPLICATIONS: WHAT WE CAN LEARN FROM CANTWELL 
In Cantwell, Justice Roberts, writing for the Supreme Court, made precedent-
setting arguments about religious liberty and free speech in the United States. The case 
had great impact: it formed the basis for the majority of free exercise court cases that 
followed.137 However, Justice Roberts’s written opinion ignored some of the facts of the 
case considered most crucial in the lower court decisions. Some of this can be attributed 
to the way the Supreme Court operated and continues to operate. Supreme Court Justices 
read briefs and listened to short oral arguments by specially trained lawyers. Justices 
interrupted those lawyers with questions and the lawyers never fully orally delivered their 
carefully planned arguments. The Justices limited the discussion to those points that 
impacted their interest in the case.  
Justices focused on what constituted religious worship and, therefore, were 
subject to protections of free exercise in Cantwell. This enabled Justices to largely push 
aside the facts and context that created the local dispute and the resulting legal case. The 
Supreme Court Justices and legal scholars who later analyzed the Supreme Court opinion 
were most interested in articulating precedents to be used in related cases. This meant 
that the detail about religious conflict only mattered insofar as they allowed Justice 
Roberts to articulate the point the Court wanted to make about one particular 
constitutional principle – that free exercise was a primary right and should be 
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incorporated to the states.   To the degree that the local detail did not help Justice Roberts 
articulate that constitutional principle, he and the other Justices were unconcerned if 
those facts were lost. Although he referenced some of the facts of the case in his opinion, 
Justice Roberts largely ignored the claims of the participants involved in the earliest days 
of the dispute over the Cantwells’ actions.   
Reconstructing local detail, as I have tried to do in my analysis of Cantwell v. 
Connecticut, could enrich scholarly interpretation of cases by both scholars of U.S. law 
and scholars of U.S. religion. This case set a major precedent -- the incorporation of free 
exercise and free speech from the First Amendment of the Constitution to state 
jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the precedent grew from an interesting case surrounding the 
events that occurred when Newton Cantwell drove with his wife and two teenage sons 
from Woodbridge, Connecticut, to Cassius Street in neighboring New Haven, 
Connecticut to proselytize.  
IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. LEGAL SCHOLARS: LOCAL CONTEXT MATTERS  
By reconstructing the local context in Cantwell, problems raised by the 
Connecticut Constitution emerged. Yet no judge at any level of the judicial system 
addressed those concerns. In Cantwell at the Supreme Court, justices overturned state 
law, but did not overturn or even address the state constitution. The state constitution 
could be read to enable such laws that strive to protect the public safety, even if they 
impinge upon free exercise in the state. The Supreme Court could have addressed this 
section of the Connecticut Constitution. Federal judges wield that power. This issue has 
become even more salient. For example, in recent years, federal judges invalidated state 
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constitutional amendments, including controversial cases moving through the court 
system currently, about the constitutionality of amendments to state constitutions 
prohibiting same-sex marriage.  
One way to address state laws and constitutions could have been through the 
Supremacy Clause. The Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution established the U.S. 
Constitution, federal laws, and U.S. treaties as “the supreme law of the land.” In Article 
6, Section 2, the Supremacy Clause says, “the judges in every state shall be bound 
thereby, anything in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding.” 
As early as 1819, the Supreme Court articulated that it had the power to invalidate any 
state action that conflicted with the U.S. Constitution, federal law, or treaties.138 Why did 
the Supreme Court not invoke this in the Cantwell case? This question has not sparked 
scholarship in the past, so we await more research before we can be more certain. There 
are, however, at least two plausible reasons that the Supreme Court did not use the 
Supremacy Clause: the Supreme Court had never previously cited the Supremacy Clause 
in cases dealing with the Bill of Rights, or the Supreme Court’s own precedents at the 
time made it easier to make decisions about incorporation using the Fourteenth 
Amendment Due Process Clause.  
As in this case, Supreme Court Justices have frequently invoked the authority of 
precedents and this could have been another reason the process obscured the local context 
in Cantwell. Precedents, according to legal scholars Ryan Black and James Spriggs, are 
defined as legal principles that have articulated “legal consequences or tests that follow 
                                                
138 See McCulloch v. Maryland 17 U.S. 316 (1819). 
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from particular sets of factual circumstances.”139 Although not always followed, 
precedents have been an important way for Supreme Court Justices to justify decisions. 
This tendency for Justices to follow the lead of previous decisions came from the legal 
principal of stare decisis. Stare decisis emerged out of the British common law system, 
upon which the U.S. legal system was based.  Literally meaning, “let the decision stand,” 
stare decisis is “the policy of courts to abide by or adhere to principles established from 
earlier cases.”140 It implies that courts should start with principles set up by previous 
rulings articulated by the Supreme Court. Precedents have not usually changed quickly. 
Major revisions are rare and usually accompany a significant shift in interpretation. Some 
precedents have been completely overruled. The Barron v. Baltimore’s precedent—that 
the Supreme Court could not rule on an action of a city in 1833— was eventually 
overturned in the twentieth century. The abandonment of the Barron precedent can also 
be attributed to the addition of the Fourteenth Amendment and its impact on the 
Constitution as a whole. In proposing that free exercise applied to the states, the Supreme 
Court established a major new precedent. Still, even that new precedent was based on the 
stare decisis principle, because it was in line with how they were deciding similar cases 
about First Amendment freedoms in light of the Fourteenth and about information 
dissemination cases from the previous two years. This meant that the local case only 
nominally mattered to how the case would be decided and justified. Taking the local-
                                                
139 Ryan Black and James Spriggs, “The Citation and Depreciation of U.S. Supreme Court Precedent,” 
Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 10 no.2 (2013): 325-358. 
140 “Stare decisis,” Gale Encyclopedia of American Law, ed. Donna Batten,  3rd ed. Detroit: Gale, 
2010:336. 
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centered approach I have advocated in this study could help legal scholars be more 
critical of the justices’ tendency to rely on precedent and stare decisis because that 
practice tends to obscure the facts of the case.   
Some scholars of U.S. law attend carefully to theoretical discourse, while others 
pay greater attention to some religious practitioners, but few give sufficient attention to 
historical context. Christopher Eisgruber and Lawrence Sager, respected legal scholars, 
pay great attention to the theoretical undergirding of decisions, but miss many of the 
particular contextual details in order to produce a prescriptive analysis that helps inform 
the legal scholars with a normative bend.141 That approach is important, but more 
scholars of U.S. law should take the lead of Noah Feldman, who deals with religion in a 
more evenhanded way and cares more deeply about historical context. Unfortunately the 
main point Feldman emphasizes is prescriptive and he also falls into the trap of focusing 
on precedents. But the historical reconstruction is there.142 
IMPLICATIONS FOR RELIGIOUS HISTORIANS: LAW MATTERS 
Another reason for focusing on the local context is to take seriously the religious 
claims of the participants That attention has been a strength of the few religious historians 
who have taken law seriously.143 As I have tried to demonstrate in this case study, 
religious studies scholars who focus on the U.S. might benefit from learning more about 
                                                
141 Christopher L. Eisgruber and Lawrence G. Sager, Religious Freedom and the Constitution, 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Universty Press, 2007). 
142 Noah R. Feldman, Divided by God: America's Church-State Problem - And What We Should Do About 
It (Farrar, Straus & Giroux 2005). 
143 See Edwin Gaustad, Faith of the Founders, Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, Paying the Words Extra, Tisa 
Wenger, We have a Religion, Amanda Porterfield, Conceived in Doubt, Isaac Weiner, Religion Out Loud. 
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how non-specialists of religion have dealt with religion in the public sphere. That would 
enrich their historical work as well as help to fill in the gaps in understanding of religious 
issues by legal scholars.  Better understanding of theology, practice, and religious identity 
can make for a more complete and nuanced analysis of cases.  
The reverse is also true. By understanding how the law mediates religious 
practice, religious studies scholars can better understand the actions and interactions of 
religious people at different moments in history. Some scholars trained in both fields, like 
Sarah Barringer Gordon, are able to do this particularly well.144 More religious studies 
scholars need to follow the lead of Gordon, Tisa Wenger, and Isaac Weiner and take 
careful notice of where law affected U.S. religious history.145 Even if law is not the 
subject of inquiry for a given project, looking at the legal structure within which religious 
participants operate could help historical studies. While some studies, like mine, clearly 
intersect with law, others only do so in a tangential manner. The Jehovah’s Witnesses in 
this case directly challenged the status quo in the legal sphere because of a perceived new 
opening in Constitutional interpretation. Context matters and the legal context can be a 
particularly salient feature.  
As a scholar of religion, I find it deeply disturbing that Justice Roberts intimated 
that Jesse Cantwell, or even Judge Rutherford, who created the record that offended 
listeners on Cassius Street, might have been exaggerating to persuade listeners. To Justice 
Roberts’ Episcopalian ears, the Jehovah’s Witness’ perspective on Catholic hierarchy 
                                                
144 Sarah Barringer Gordon, The Mormon Question: Polygamy and Constitutional Conflict in Nineteenth 
Century America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001). 
145 Tisa Wenger, We have a Religion, and Isaac Weiner, Religion Out Loud. 
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might have seemed overblown, but it sounded very similar to language of a slightly 
earlier era. The anti-Catholic rhetoric of the Jehovah’s Witnesses would have been 
familiar to the mostly Protestant court and most adults who lived through the “tribal 
twenties,” to use the phrase Martin Marty popularized to describe the ethnic and religious 
intolerance of the era.146 In any case, the Catholics who heard the message reacted as if it 
was religiously bigoted. These facts make a difference in the story of religious history in 
the United States. Thus the intervention of religious studies scholars, I hope, can help by 
providing the adequate context for a richer interpretation, one that recovers the beliefs 
and practices of all the participants.  
Other cases raise similar issues. For example, in Bowen v. Roy (1986), Native 
American parents petitioned to not have a Social Security number assigned to their child 
because they believe that the number will “rob the spirit of [their] daughter and prevent 
her from attaining greater spiritual power.”147 In direct contradiction to the petitioner’s 
claim, Chief Justice Burger claimed, “The Federal Government's use of a Social Security 
number for Little Bird of the Snow does not itself in any degree impair Roy's ‘freedom to 
believe, express, and exercise’ his religion.”148 Of course, these decisions were likely 
difficult to make, as the Court ended up with plurality opinions in Bowen, meaning that 
the Justices did not agree on how to decide the case. Nevertheless, this complexity in 
                                                
146 Martin Marty, Modern American Religion, Volume 2: The Noise of Conflict, 1919-1941, (Chicago: 
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determining what mattered to people religiously and deciding whether those religious 
concerns were most important was a difficult task for Supreme Court Justices and others 
in the legal profession.149 
Similarly, while Justice Roberts’ legal principles were likely sound in Cantwell, 
his brushing aside of the listeners’ offense was problematic. Free exercise of religion in 
this case only provided free exercise of religion for the Jehovah’s Witnesses. It did not 
protect the Catholics’ free exercise of religion from the free exercise of the Jehovah’s 
Witnesses. Of course, that could have opened many other issues with which the Court did 
not want to deal. Taking seriously the religious practices and rights of all citizens 
involved, not just those who were arrested, could be another way for scholars of religion 
to contribute to legal history.   
Currently the Supreme Court is considering a case in which the court is being 
asked to decide whose rights triumph. The Supreme Court heard arguments over the 
Affordable Care Act’s requirement of employers to provide certain types of preventative 
reproductive care for women. In Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. and Conestoga 
Wood Specialties Corp. v. Kathleen Sebelius, the owners of these two corporations 
objected on religious grounds to providing certain types of birth control required by the 
Affordable Care Act. In the oral argument, some Justices questioned lawyers about the 
rights of the workers. These Justices raised questions of whether there was an imposition 
                                                
149 For a major critique of the legal field’s inadequacies on religion see, Winifred Sullivan’s Impossibility 
of Religious Freedom, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2005). 
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by the employer on the employees in addition to the law’s imposition on the employer.150 
The court could side strictly with the employer, strictly with the law and employee, 
attempt to craft a compromise, or duck the issue due to legal technicalities, as has been 
known to happen in other cases.151  In a few months when the Supreme Court releases 
opinions we will see. From the precedents formulated by the Cantwell case, it would 
seem that the employees’ rights would not be addressed. Those precedents may not hold. 
It is now seventy-four years later, there is an entirely new court, and the rights of freedom 
from the free exercise of others could be considered. 
The Cantwell case brought together two religious minorities battling for influence 
and prestige in the 1930s, and a rich account of what happened depends on reconstructing 
the contextual particulars. The period mattered, the place mattered, and the people 
mattered. The ways in which different judicial levels responded to the incidents 
surrounding Cantwell and the huge impact that each made on the legal field is instructive. 
In learning more through this case study, a better picture emerges of the religious and 
legal situation of the 1930s. Connecticut tried to protect the local Catholics from the 
disruption caused by the visiting Cantwells. The Supreme Court protected the Cantwells’ 
right to proselytize without significant regard to the rights of the Catholics to be protected 
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from abuse. It will be interesting to see if the rights of free exercise of Hobby Lobby and 
Conestoga Wood owners are protected, even if they impact employees.  The Cantwells 
and their religious community were the clear victors in their case.152 The Catholic 
residents of Cassius Street were the clear losers. Hopefully, the current court will dig in 
to the local context and consider the rights of both the owners and employees in the 
Hobby Lobby and Conestoga Wood case. No matter how the case turns out, I hope that 
scholars of religion and law will search not only for precedents and principles, but also 
try to reconstruct the complex interactions of religious actors in their particular time and 
place. 
                                                
152 This is not to discount the other “winners” who got their day in federal court due to incorporation of the 
free exercise clause, including Wisconsin v. Yoder 406 U.S. 205 (1972) and Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye 
v. City of Hialeah 508 U.S. 520 (1993).  
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